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Abstract. User authentication is an important and usually nal bar-
rier to detect and prevent illicit access. Nonetheless it can be broken or
tricked, leaving the system and its data vulnerable to abuse. In this pa-
per we consider how eye tracking can enable the system to hypothesize if
the user is familiar with the system he operates, or if he is an unfamiliar
intruder. Based on an eye tracking experiment conducted with 12 users
and various stimuli, we investigate which conditions and measures are
most suited for such an intrusion detection. We model the user's gaze be-
havior as a selector for information ow via the relative conditional gaze
entropy. We conclude that this feature provides the most discriminative
results with static and repetitive stimuli.
1 Introduction
A common problem in security is the detection and prevention of illicit access.
There are a multitude of security measures in use to prevent illicit access, e.g.,
PINs, tokens or asymmetric keys [9]. However, once `authenticated' no subse-
quent checks are performed, rendering the system vulnerable to various attacks
in case the user forgets or is prevented from logging o|or simply if his token is
being stolen or copied. A possible solution is to replace single point authentica-
tion with a continuous biometric one [1] [13] relying on features inherent to the
individual itself, such as the iris [3], facial features [2], or ngerprints. However
a problem with these methods is that they can, sometimes by the most simple
means [12], be copied or forged likewise. It has also been suggested to use eye
tracking as an interactive biometrics based on shared secrets (e.g., [5], [4] or
[10]) and task dependent user behavior [7] [6], which could render some of the
attacks impossible or at least harder. However, most of the presented methods
still require explicit interaction.
With these observations in mind, we reconsider the use of task learning eects
[6] for the detection of illicit access. The key idea is that a user in her usually
highly individualized working environment is the only person inherently familiar
with the layout and content of many of the frequently presented stimuli. Other
users are likely to produce a signicantly higher amount of searching, reading
or comprehension behavior in situations to which the true user is already accus-
tomed to. Eventually this searching and sense-making behavior is likely to reect
in the user's eye movements and there is a chance for the system to observe it
through eye tracking.
Obviously, not every task or stimulus will be equally suited to detect famil-
iarity. Hence, in this paper we will investigate three dierent types of stimuli2
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Fig.1. Outline of the proposed system: the users will encounter various well known
points in their system interaction, such as document overviews or dialog text. By
observing their gaze behavior and interaction on these stimuli we try to estimate to
what extent the user is familiar with the presented information. Unfamiliarity provides
evidence of an ongoing intrusion.
and two metrics. We also report how candidates for a more detailed subsequent
analysis should look like. In Section 2 we outline our theoretical considerations
on the proposed detection system. In Section 3 we present an eye tracking ex-
periment in which we recorded the interaction of a group of 12 users on three
dierent stimuli types. In Section 4 we provide an analysis of various features to
distinguish familiar from unfamiliar users. We conclude with Section 5, outlining
how we will continue our research.
2 Working Hypothesis
We base our intrusion detector on task learning eects [6]. The learning eect
assumes that users become increasingly familiar with certain tasks and layouts
converging their behavior to more optimized or informed pattern. In the daily in-
teraction, a legit user would operate the system normally and encounter various
key points, most of which he should rapidly pass with little eort. In contrast, an
attacker would be challenged with the additional burden of rst comprehending
the interface before he would be able to interact with it. Over time the system
can therefore compute a hypothesis on the user's familiarity with the presented
responses. Should the user's reaction after one or several passes accumulate ev-
idence that he is not familiar with the system this is an indicator for possible
compromising.3
3 Experiment
We prepared a workow in which participants are asked perform three tasks,
simulating how a user would interact and familiarize with a working environment.
They check for mails in a web based interface and receive messages from their
hypothetical supervisor, instructing them to read and research on various topics.
The experiment consists of four rounds. Each round is structured in the same
way. It starts with an overview page that reminds the users of their task. This
page also contains navigational links to various mails. Each mail is written by the
users imaginary employer, contains a visible mail header, the same introduction
and a variable part describing their task for this round. It also contains links
to two or three attached documents about dierent encyclopedic topics. In the
end, the users are presented a questionnaire that contains various comprehension
questions to ensure they really do as being told.
We invited 12 users (11 of them male), their average age was 24.6 years and
most of them were university students. We did not reveal the true purpose of
the study, instead users were told to participate in a general text comprehension
study. The overall time for the experiment ranged between 30 to 45 minutes. For
the whole interaction session, the user's gaze data, along with a number of other
features, was recorded on a Tobii 1750 device, sampled with 50 Hz (compare
Figure 1).
4 Evaluation
Our analysis of the recorded data focuses on two aspects. We start by analyzing
and comparing a number of metrics to model familiarity on a stimulus when
considering eye movements, with a special focus on the relative entropy of per-
ceived information. In the second part of the evaluation we then train a classier
on a subset of users and predict how such an algorithm would generalize.
4.1 Features for detecting users in an unfamiliar environment
As stated, the working hypothesis is that users who are unfamiliar with the
working environment can passively be discriminated from users that are familiar
with this environment. To test this hypothesis we develop a set of features that
can be extracted while a user is working at a computer screen. In the following
we describe these features and in Section 4.2 we report on our experimental
ndings of a user study. For the remainder of this paper we consider especially
xations. All recorded data has been de-noised with an independent median lter
and xations are detected using a (25px, 100ms) dispersion window.
Processing time Probably the simplest feature that one can use to discrimi-
nate informed users from uninformed users is the processing time for a task. In
practice, such a task can have several forms. For instance it could be the task of
selecting an icon in a window containing a set of icons. Here processing starts as
soon as the user opens the window document, the end point is be the rst click
on a navigation link. However, since document or stimulus processing can often
be interrupted we only focus on the time the user was actually considering the
page, this is: the sum of all xation times on that stimulus.4
Relative conditional gaze entropy We assume that an uninformed user
would scan the stimulus for relevant information while the informed user would
nd the relevant information more directly[11]. If this assumption holds then the
gaze of an uninformed user would visit the set of objects with potential relevance
in an unpredictable way while for the informed user it would be easy to predict
that she gazes at the relevant objects.
To quantitatively measure this information we propose the relative condi-
tional gaze entropy (RCGE) as follows. Let O = fo1;o2;:::;ong be the areas of
the screen that show candidate objects (for instance, the set of icons in a window
or the set of words in a text). One such area is the set of pixels showing one
object. We treat a gaze point as a random variable G and consider g to be a
random outcome of a trial, eectively modeling the stimulus as an information
source operated and observed by the user. Then the relative conditional gaze
entropy (RCGE) is
H(Gjg2O) :=  log2(n) 1
n ∑
i=1
p(g2oijg2O)log2(p(g2oijg2O)) (1)
Here g2oi means that the user xates at one particular object oi and g2O means
that the user's gaze g is located in anyone of the candidate areas. By dividing
with the entropy log2(n) of the uniform distribution, this measure becomes a
relative entropy score between 0 and 1, where 1 refers to maximum entropy and
0 means the user stares at a single object o.
Let G = fg1;g2;:::;gkg be the measured gaze coordinates of a user working at
the computer screen. We then estimate the involved probabilities p(g2oijg2O)
by the relative object frequencies hi
hi :=
 
 
k ∑
j=1
I(gj 2oi)
 
 
 
 
k ∑
j=1
I(gj 2O)
 
 
 1
(2)
Here, the indicator function I(p) returns 1 if the predicate p is true and 0 if it
is false. Note that we designed this measure in a general way. It can be applied
to content of various kinds such as, for instance, documents, icons, options in
drop-down lists, or any other information carrying element.
In our experiment we dened a geometric bounding box for each of the words
in the document and counted the relative word frequencies hi while the users
processed the document. For tasks other than reading, it might be advantageous
to record gaze over a constant time window and count frequencies for other
geometric bins.
4.2 Results
We compute the described features for three kinds of documents that the users
repeatedly encountered during the experiment. The results can be seen in Fig-
ure 2. From left to right the results refer to a constant description of some rules
(this is always the same document), the emails from a ctional supervisor ex-
plaining the current task (parts of this mail change over the repetitions), and
the working documents themselves (completely varying content).5
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Fig.2. Relative conditional gaze entropy versus processing time of unfamiliar users
(users who see this kind of document for the rst time) and informed users (who see it
the fourth time). Measurements are carried out on three dierent kinds of documents:
Constant navigational content (navigation pages, left) and varying information in a
particular part of the text (mails, middle position). Note that for the documents (right)
the content of the rst and forth pass dier. They serve as a baseline comparison for
our features.
We observe that while a user repeatedly works with documents of one kind
both the processing time and the RCGE decrease, as can be seen in Figure 2,
left. The class of familiar users and the class of new users are linearly separable in
this 2D feature space. The less relevant the content of a document is the stronger
is this eect. For classes of documents with lots of varying relevant content, the
informed user can not be discriminated from the uninformed user, that is: their
RCGE scores and processing times are not separable (see for instance Figure 2,
right). This inuence of content relevance has an impact to the choice of screen
content that can be used for intrusion detection. The detector requires screen
content that is ideally constant over many repeated visits or that changes only
little (such as documents that change in content only at a few places). This
insight guides our future work towards using stimuli as, for instance, desktop
icons or menu items.
As a second observation we note that processing time is less reliable than
RCGE. Some of the users processed the constant rule screen at rst sight as
fast as users that are familiar with the screen. Obviously, it is possible to realize
quickly that a screen content is not relevant at all. However, this still requires
some search over the dierent objects of interest such that the gaze pattern of
these unfamiliar but fast users is more entropic than those of familiar users.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
We presented a novel idea for assisting intrusion detection with eye tracking
data. We showed that modeling textual key points as an information source,
transmitted to the eye for task processing, we can distinguish informed users
from uninformed users for some stimuli and tasks. Based on such an information
transmission model it appears that especially information-rich but static stimuli
which are encountered repeatedly provide the best grounds for such a detection.6
There are a number of interesting directions we want to address in the future.
We especially consider le- and folder navigation to be highly promising, since
these structures are relatively stable over time and are frequently visited while
working on a machine. Another possible direction might be the investigation of
actual behavior on individual key words. Since a familiarity eect on words and
its inuence on xation time (compare [8]) is well known, the observation of
xation times on specic low frequency words that are familiar to the user could
also be an option to investigate.
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